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Introduction 
UK newspapers have exerted manifest structuring effects over Britain’s national debates 
about ‘Europe’. First, the UK newspaper market is dominated by various forms of 
Eurosceptical sentiment and since the Eurozone crisis in particular has expounded a form of 
‘hard Euroscepticism’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004) which extolls the merits of EU 
withdrawal. Second, Eurosceptical journalists have popularized a Eurosceptic discourse 
through which European integration is constructed both as ‘over there’ and as an implied or 
explicit threat to British sovereignty interests and national identity (Anderson and Weymouth 
1998; Hawkins 2012). Chris Gifford has usefully described this ‘populist politics’ of 
Euroscepticism in his account of the ideological manifestations of Euroscepticism in the UK 
(Gifford 2014, p.6). It draws on an obsession with past conflicts and the Second World War 
especially, which have provided British Eurosceptics with a range of linguistic weapons to 
keep their audiences in a ‘permanent state of discursive war’ (Daddow 2011, pp.109–34) with 
a malign ‘other’ across the English Channel (Gifford 2006). 
Third, with elite Europhile opinion seeping away in elite political discourse and 
policy the UK press has been a significant factor in agenda-setting on European issues policy 
through the ‘climate of fear’ it has generated against the public espousal of pro-European 
narratives (Daddow 2012). Comparatively speaking, Britain is home to an ‘unusually 
Eurosceptical media market’ especially on the press side: this goes for the volume of 
Eurosceptical coverage and the bombastic, nationalistic and sometimes xenophobic tone of 
that coverage (Ford et al. 2012 p.207). Even rhetorically pro-European parties of government, 
such as New Labour under Tony Blair, responded to implied or real press threats by trying to 
decrease the salience of the European issue in British politics (Oppermann 2008) and refusing 
to confront the most hostile media barons such as Rupert Murdoch (Price 2005, p.79; Liddle 
2014). By pursuing a strategy of ‘defensive engagement’ over the past two decades 
(Sherrington 2006) UK politicians have effectively handed over ideational leadership on 
European matters to a press-dominated UK media which has found since the Maastricht 
Treaty that there are increasing numbers of opportunities to express opposition to the 
European project as the EU itself has enlarged and deepened in response to changes in the 
international system (Usherwood and Startin 2013, pp.3–4). Espousing Euroscepticism has 
also been good for business (see Wilkes and Wring 1998, pp.200–204). Meanwhile, the UK 
public continues to be apathetic to the point of hostile on EU matters: ‘a large portion of the 
population is eurosceptic’ (Gannon 2014, p.212; see also Harmsen and Schild 2011, pp.254–
55; Leconte 2010, p.70 and p.113; Hawkins 2012, p.561; Usherwood and Startin 2013, p.6; 
Vasilopoulou 2013, 161) and there is a plethora of UK civil society actors mobilized against 
further integration and now pushing the case for withdrawal (FitzGibbon 2013, p.114). 
UK media coverage of European affairs reflects a sullen resistance to the EU 
(Wallace 2005, p.56) rooted in a concern to safeguard a supposedly cohesive and historically 
resonant ‘British’ identity and sovereignty (see Díez Medrano 2003, pp.128–145) sometimes 
laced with unpleasant xenophobic dimensions. The press glorifies diplomatic spats between 
the UK and the EU and/or traditional ‘enemies’ such as France and Germany (Brookes 1999) 
and regularly alerts readers to ‘the alleged unfinished nature of Germany’s historic 
expansionist ambitions’ (Anderson and Weymouth 1998, p.68). It also privileges stories 
about ‘Brussels’ directives which are represented as ‘absurd rulings imposed on the UK by 
alien institutions’ (Spiering 2004, p.139), in the negotiation of which British representatives 
apparently have no say. Entertainment and the search for scandal, corruption and salacious 
gossip take precedence over information about how the EU operates – or sympathy for it 
(Menon 2004, p.44). Given that the media ‘is citizens’ principal source of information on EU 
affairs’ (Hawkins 2012, p.561) it is important to account for the structuring potential and 
effects on national debates of media discourse. This is particularly pertinent in the UK case 
because even though it has been found that the public can be sceptical of what they read in 
newspapers and hear on television, this has done nothing to lessen the impact of media 
Euroscepticism on the UK public’s affective distaste for the EU and its institutions. In short 
‘British citizens feel significantly less European than others’ (Bruter 2009, p.1523). 
This chapter adds to research into the British press and European integration by 
adding a new case: newspaper coverage of David Cameron’s Bloomberg speech, delivered in 
London on 23 January 2013. Few speeches by a UK prime minister have been as eagerly 
anticipated as this because speculation about the future of Britain’s relationship with the EU 
had been intensifying in salience throughout the first half of the coalition government 
(Gannon 2014, pp.222–23). The Eurozone crisis (see Serricchio et al., 2013), concerns about 
the scale of immigration to the UK from an enlarged EU and the rise of the UK Independence 
Party (UKIP – see Chapter 7) inflamed Eurosceptic Conservative backbench opinion which 
had already formed the view that Britain was dangerously ‘shackled to the corpse of Europe’ 
(Hannan 2012). The chapter treats the Bloomberg speech as a ten day political drama which 
unfolded in three ‘acts’, using qualitative discourse analysis of the press coverage to answer 
three research questions over its three parts respectively. One, how did UK newspapers 
anticipate the contents of the Bloomberg speech? Two, what did Cameron say in his address? 
Three, how did newspapers report the Bloomberg speech? The chapter advances the central 
argument that press coverage of the Bloomberg speech can be treated as part of the ongoing 
cultural ‘performance’ of Euroscepticism in Britain which has strongly structural (but not 
deterministic) effects on how newspapers frame European policy debates for their readers. It 
concurs with Simon Usherwood and Nick Startin’s verdict that UK press coverage of 
European affairs is ‘one-sided’ (Usherwood and Startin 2013, p.10) and highly resistant to 
permeation by pro-European voices. An already hard UK press scepticism has become even 
harder and as the Bloomberg speech coverage indicates, many UK journalists now actively 
look forward to a possible British withdrawal from the EU. 
Act I: the build-up to Bloomberg 
Momentous political speeches attract a good deal of press attention and are accompanied by 
days’ worth of briefing or ‘spinning’ from ministers looking to build coalitions of support 
behind the projected policy positions set out in the address (see Donaldson 2013). UK press 
coverage of the Bloomberg speech fitted this pattern of extensive scene-setting with 
supporters and opponents lining up on each side of the debate to have their say. The 
newspaper reportage examined in this chapter was located by a search of the Nexis database 
for the terms ‘Cameron’ and/or ‘EU’ and/or ‘Europe’ and/or ‘Bloomberg’ for the dates 14–25 
January inclusive. This was supplemented by a separate search of the Financial Times 
archive because this newspaper does not feature on the Nexis database. The articles retrieved 
were from national and regional newspapers across Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
including newspaper blogs. All newspapers feature in the data analysis sections below 
irrespective of position within the market judged by sales or readership numbers because the 
chapter is interested in the broad texture of the coverage indicated by the key themes 
journalists privileged in their reporting. 
In the build-up to the speech the press coverage converged on three themes: its 
timing, likely contents, and potential ramifications for British European policy. The first 
theme concerned the timing and fed representations of Cameron as a dithering and weak 
leader. In the Guardian Nicholas Watt opined that the speech was ‘delayed by months amid 
Tory divisions and concerns on the continent that Britain is moving to the exit’ (Watt 2013a). 
It was time Cameron put a stop to his ‘dither over the EU’, Stephen Pollard commented in the 
Express: ‘Its shambolic scheduling is a reflection of the subject matter itself’ (Pollard 2013). 
‘Embarrassing’ was how Kate Devlin described the scheduling in The Herald (Devlin 2013). 
The Times wrote of ‘a chaotic air to the final preparations’ (Watson and Charter 2013a). Their 
disquiet came from repeated changes of date for the speech. The Downing Street Twitter feed 
initially announced that the speech would take place in the Netherlands on 18 January (Hall 
2013a). Following the hostage crisis in Algeria in which six Britons died (an event noticeable 
by its almost total absence from the press coverage) Cameron was forced to put the speech 
back to 21 January (Donaldson 2103), but this was ruled out because it coincided with Barack 
Obama’s Inauguration Day in the US (Dominiczak 2013). 
However, the revised date of 22 January was found to clash with the 5th anniversary 
of the signing of the Franco-German Elysée Treaty. This was manna from heaven for 
Cameron’s critics and hard Eurosceptical newspapers such as the Mail which gleefully 
reported that ministers were ‘aghast that the timing of the speech has been shifted to appease 
the Germans’ (Chapman 2013; Chorley 2013b). Negative frames accenting Cameron’s 
weakness and the need to be suspicious of ‘the Germans’ (Sun 2013a) were repeatedly used 
in Eurosceptical reportage. Jason Groves’s explanation was emblematic: ‘changing the date 
to appease the Germans … German Chancellor Angel Merkel is believed to have raised the 
issue with Mr Cameron at the weekend, warning him that it would be seen as a serious 
diplomatic slight’ (Groves 2013). Merkel (or ‘Berlin’) was widely reported to have ‘reacted 
angrily’ at news of the 22 January date (Groves 2013; Watt 2013a). All in all, wrote Jason 
Beattie in the Daily Mirror, it was a ‘humiliating rebuke’ by Merkel (Beattie 2013a). The 
Times front page for 15 January likewise suggested that Cameron had been ‘forced’ to bring 
the speech forward ‘under pressure from Germany’ (Watson and Charter 2013a). 
By altering the date again, the Express concluded, Cameron had ducked ‘a diplomatic 
row with the French and Germans’ but would use the speech to instigate ‘a fight for a new 
relationship with the EU’. To hammer home the ‘Us versus Them’ military metaphor, Hall 
had Cameron embarked on a ‘diplomatic blitz to try to stop the speech opening a rift with 
Britain’s allies (Hall 2013a). Elsewhere, Cameron’s discussions with Britain’s EU partners 
were described as a ‘charm offensive’ (Devlin 2013; Watson and Charter 2013a) or a 
‘diplomatic offensive’ (Dominiczak 2013) to prepare the ground for a new UK relationship 
with the EU. Several journalists, particularly those traditionally on the left of centre, quoted 
Labour Shadow Foreign Secretary Douglas Alexander’s verdict on the timing of the address: 
‘When it comes to Cameron’s speech on Europe, he can’t seem to decide on a date, let alone 
a policy. It’s a shambles’ (quoted in Beattie 2013a; see also Warrell 2012; Barnes 2013). In 
sum, newspaper coverage of the timing of the speech did not paint Cameron in a positive 
light. He was seen to be changing his position (physically in terms of venue and rhetorically 
in the speech itself) at the behest of a powerful coalition of forces arrayed against him: his 
party, big business and Britain’s EU partners (Crichton 2013). 
The second theme of press coverage in the build-up to the speech was its likely 
contents. Using on-the-record Downing Street press briefings and Cameron’s pre-speech 
round of radio and television interviews, the press was well able to divine that Cameron 
would announce a referendum on Britain’s EU membership at Bloomberg. There was a clear 
link between the press descriptions and the prior views on Europe advanced by the 
newspaper. All the newspapers reported the key factual point that the referendum or 
‘plebiscite’ (Straw 2013) would be ‘on Europe’ (Grice 2013; Groves 2013), on ‘UK 
membership the European Union’ (Crichton 2013; Watt, 2013a) or ‘on our membership of 
the club’ (Chu 2013). From here the journalists were free to speculate on the likely timeline 
and precise commitment to be made. In some cases it was reported the referendum would be 
on the ‘new settlement with Brussels’ (Belfast Telegraph 2013) Cameron would announce 
‘after trying to renegotiate Britain’s deal with Brussels’ (Groves 2013; see also Hall 2013a). 
Traditionally less Eurosceptical newspapers tend to avoid the shorthand ‘Brussels’, with the 
negative connotations that word evokes in the British context. The Guardian for example 
recorded that the renegotiation would be on ‘the terms of Britain’s EU membership’ (Watt 
2013a). 
The idea behind the negotiation, journalists felt, was for ‘a new deal with Europe’ 
(Devlin 2013), with ‘Britain to repatriate powers from the European Union’ (Waterson 2013; 
see also Warrell 2012; Watt 2013a). Eurosceptical newspapers such as The Daily Telegraph 
described this as being about taking ‘some powers from Brussels to Britain’ (Dominiczak 
2013) and wrote of Cameron’s plan ‘to retrieve powers from Brussels’ (Beattie 2013). The 
renegotiation was also described as an arduous process ‘of clawbacks of power from 
Brussels’ (Beattie 2013a; Chorley 2013a; Lawson 2013), illustrating how UK journalists tend 
to assert a huge imbalance in power relations between the UK (a defiant but less powerful 
supplicant) on the one hand and the EU (an unforgiving and more powerful hoarder of 
power) on the other. The Manchester Evening News summed up the general tone by writing 
that Cameron wants to ‘repatriate some sovereign powers from Brussels back to Britain’ 
(Ferguson 2013). Other Eurosceptical opinion shone through in the claim that the 
renegotiation would ‘offer a chance for Britain to establish a more arms-length relationship 
with the bloc’s 26 partners’ (Waterson 2013) and ‘a chance to reject the new terms in a 
referendum’ (Watson and Charter 2013a). The Daily Mail looked forward to the opportunity 
to fashion a ‘looser, more trade-based relationship with Brussels’ (Chapman 2013). The 
withdrawalist position was at its strongest in The Daily Star’s coverage of 15 January, which 
spent 200 words on the cost to the UK taxpayer of Members of the European Parliament 
before recording as an afterthought that the prime minister ‘is under mounting pressure for a 
referendum on quitting Europe’ (Nicks 2013). Some column inches were given over to expert 
opinion on the kinds of EU reform that might suit Britain in any renegotiation (Straw 2013), 
but it was the potential for withdrawal that featured most prominently. 
The third theme of the newspaper coverage in the build-up to the Bloomberg speech 
was the likely consequences for British politics and party management. Two issues featured 
especially prominently. One related to critical comments made about the prospect of a 
referendum by Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg who warned that uncertainty about 
Britain’s membership of the EU could have a ‘chilling effect’ by chasing away foreign 
investment and threatening job creation at an already difficult time for the economy (Belfast 
Telegraph 2013; Watson and Charter 2013b). The editorial in Scotland’s Daily Record and 
Sunday Mail (2013) saw the referendum as a cynical attempt to ‘appease [Conservative] 
backbenchers’ and warned its readers to ‘prepare yourself for years of economic and political 
uncertainty as the Tories wrestle Britain into the ground over Europe’. Fed by politicians on 
the Liberal Democrat side such as Clegg and the government’s Business Secretary Vince 
Cable who made a pro-European speech just before Cameron’s (see Winnett 2013), talk of 
economic ‘uncertainty’ repeatedly featured in national press discourse in the build-up to the 
speech (for instance Chu 2013; Chapman 2013; McRae 2013). Regional newspapers found 
local experts to support this view (see Ferguson 2013). A small minority of articles noted 
comments about the security dimension and the ‘dangers of abandoning EU justice measures’ 
via a bungled renegotiation or withdrawal (Barnes 2013; Watt 2013a). 
Some voices attacking concerns about ‘uncertainty’ were heard on both sides of the 
debate, showing how finely balanced the economics of membership have come to be, 
especially since the Eurozone crisis. On the withdrawalist side, for example, the Daily 
Telegraph used the views of the anti-Euro lobby group Business for Sterling to argue that 
‘uncertainty’ only mattered to long-term planning decisions by big businesses; small 
businesses were much more hostile to ‘mountainous rules and regulations’ in the Single 
European Market: ‘An uncertain future is preferable to an imprisoned one’ (Warner 2013). 
Do not listen to the outmoded ‘Eurofanatics’ in the Conservative and Labour Parties, The Sun 
editorialized, because they lack credibility on the Europe question (Sun 2013a). On the pro-
membership side, space was given during the build-up to the views of Will Straw, Associate 
Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research who argued that short-term uncertainty 
was acceptable because ‘in the longer term it will settle a question that has hampered Britain 
for years’ (Straw 2013). The economics of UK membership were clearly subservient to the 
prior views on ‘Europe’ advanced by the commentator or newspaper concerned. 
The second party management issue related to Cameron’s use of the Bloomberg 
speech to manage intra-government and intra-party squabbles, prompting more EU friendly 
publications – particularly outside English press circles – to bemoan how European policy 
had again been hijacked by an ‘extremist band of right-wing Little Englanders who have 
seized the mainstream Tory agenda’ (Daily Record and Sunday Mail 2013). The question of 
membership was ‘straining relations with the Tories’ strongly pro-EU Liberal Democrat 
coalition colleagues’ (Belfast Telegraph 2013). Clegg was widely reported to have described 
Cameron’s proposed renegotiation as ‘a false promise wrapped in a union jack’ (quoted in 
Watt 2013a), so The Mail saw ‘an increasingly ill-tempered coalition row’ in the offing 
(Chapman 2013). By far the most coverage, however, centred on Conservative Party 
divisions, framing it as yet another stage in the party in-fighting that broke out after the 
overthrow of Margaret Thatcher in 1990 (Watt 2013a). Some journalists tried to divine the 
scale of the Conservative revolt. The Daily Mirror estimated that 78% of Conservative 
Members of Parliament (MPs) ‘want out of the EU’ (Beattie 2013a), a dramatically larger 
number than that estimated in The Guardian and The Times which put it at ‘about 30’ of the 
total, or 10% (Watt 2013a; Watson and Charter 2013b). Most newspapers avoided 
quantitative analysis and opted for qualitative research. Key to the reporting were the views 
of Eurosceptical Conservative backbenchers. Cameron was said to be struggling to contain 
them and ‘under intense pressure’ to ‘use the threat of potential exit from the EU to drive a 
hard bargain with Brussels’ (Groves 2013; see also Barnes 2013). 
Former Conservative leader and ‘one of the Cabinet’s staunchest Eurosceptics’ Iain 
Duncan Smith was ‘said to be deeply unhappy to have learned that [the speech] has already 
been written’, having been promised by Cameron he would be consulted (Chapman 2013). 
Some Conservative backbenchers were calling for an immediate referendum without 
renegotiation (Waterson 2013). Others, such as prominent Eurosceptic MP Bill Cash, aligned 
with Clegg and pro-EU Conservative MPs to argue that a referendum without renegotiation 
would present a ‘false choice’ (Bill Cash, quoted in Hall, 2013a; see also the pro-EU 
Conservative voices featured in Watt 2013a). Other political voices putting pressure on 
Cameron included Nigel Farage, leader of UKIP, who hinted at Conservative defections to 
UKIP should the speech not go down well (Crichton 2013; Dominiczak 2013). The Express, 
in turn, urged a referendum to pull UKIP voters back towards the Conservative Party (Pollard 
2013; see also Watt 2013a), while a Sun editorial warned that Cameron’s ‘delaying tactics are 
playing into the hands of the fast-rising UKIP’ (Sun 2013b). Helen Warrell in The Financial 
Times (2012) concluded that to head off the UKIP threat Cameron needed to ‘make more 
effort to boost British sovereignty over Brussels’ (see also Parker 2012). Labour Party leader 
Ed Miliband was noted to have ruled out a referendum (Lawson 2013; Pollard 2013). He 
therefore received only the odd mention because his arguments were so far out of line with 
what had become a majority press opinion in favour of a public vote with or without a 
renegotiation. Having investigated the three main themes dominating the press coverage in 
the build-up to the Bloomberg speech (timing, contents and domestic politicking) the chapter 
will now outline the main contents of the speech, before moving on to study how the press 
reacted to it. 
Act II: the Bloomberg speech 
By the standards of the average political speech the Bloomberg speech was long. At over 
5,500 words it was nearly 40% longer than Margaret Thatcher’s infamous, standard-setting 
Bruges speech of September 1988 which came in at 3,400 words (Thatcher 1988). Outlining 
the Bruges speech is necessary to understanding how far and how faithfully the press reported 
it in the aftermath. 
Cameron divided his address into five parts, prefaced by a historically themed 
introduction which reviewed the part European unity played in removing the scourge of war 
from the continent and speaking of new challenges to be confronted. The opening part, titled 
‘Deliver prosperity, retain support’, echoed the Bruges speech by explaining that Britain is an 
‘island’ nation geographically and psychologically, but one which retains an inextricable set 
of connections to the continent of Europe in security and trading terms (all references in the 
remainder of this section are from Cameron 2013). The subtext of this part was that he was 
not being ‘un-European’ by proposing different visions for Europe’s future, but setting down 
an alternative perspective on Britain, which could ‘play a committed and active part’ in the 
organization. The second part explored the ‘three major challenges’ confronting Europe: the 
Eurozone crisis, Europe’s competitiveness in the global economy, and the EU’s democratic 
deficit – the ‘growing frustration that the EU is seen as something that is done to people 
rather than acting on their behalf’. Only ‘far-reaching change’, he urged, would address the 
scale of these challenges effectively. 
The third and fourth parts of the speech laid out Cameron’s five-step vision for ‘21st 
century European Union’. First, he tackled competitiveness and the completion of the single 
market, with a sideswipe at the inefficiency of the EU institutions. Second, he urged 
flexibility to accommodate diversity amongst a large and expanding membership, not all of 
whom want or need to play a full part in all areas of integration, such as the Eurozone or 
common military action in places such as Syria. Significantly, Cameron wanted to remove 
the aspiration of ‘ever closer union’ from the wording of future treaties: ‘for Britain – and 
perhaps for others – it is not the objective’. Third, Cameron drew on the need for ‘flexibility’ 
to argue ‘that power must be able to flow back to Member States, not just away from them’. 
This is the classic Thatcherite Conservative argument against ‘harmonisation’, whether for 
rules governing the single market or on ‘the environment, social affairs and crime’. Fourth, 
the prime minister put the case for ‘a bigger and more significant role for national 
parliaments’ to enhance the EU’s democratic accountability. The final part of his vision 
encompassed ‘fairness’, for Eurozone insiders and outsiders alike. Reiterating that Britain 
would not be joining the single currency Cameron suggested that Britain wanted to safeguard 
the ‘integrity and fairness’ of the single market in the face of Eurozone reforms, mainly by 
being involved in agreements on new rules for the functioning of the single market in the 
future. 
The middle of part four of the speech was the raison d’être and the most politically 
contentious portion of the speech: how to solve these problems. Public disillusionment, 
misunderstanding, referendums promised but not held: all of these had led to support for the 
EU in Britain becoming ‘wafer thin’, reported the prime minister. A referendum, he went on, 
had to be held at some point so it may as well be soon, rather than ‘simply hoping a difficult 
situation will go away’. But the referendum would only be held after a renegotiation of better 
terms of membership for Britain and the dust on the new Eurozone treaties had had time to 
settle: ‘It is wrong to ask people whether to stay or go before we have had a chance to put the 
relationship right’. 
The fifth and final part of the speech, ‘real choice’, extemporized the merits of 
holding a referendum after a renegotiation with an ‘updated European Union’. This, Cameron 
said, should be via a new treaty, although he recognized that there was little appetite for this 
amongst many current member states. He then changed voice to address the British people 
directly: ‘We will have to weigh carefully where our true national interest lies’. He 
acknowledged that Britain would still be affected by EU trade and strategic choices, even as a 
non-member (he rejected the Norway/Switzerland option), and on balance he predicted that 
Britain’s global ‘influence’ would be weaker outside than in. At the end of the speech 
Cameron showed himself to be in favour of British membership of a drastically reformed EU. 
Next, the chapter will study how the press reported and reacted to the Bloomberg speech. 
Act III: the aftermath 
Act I of the Bloomberg speech drama saw a relatively cohesive set of press opinion assessing 
the background to the speech and its likely contents, principally focussing on the domestic 
political implications. After the speech, opinion was divided on both the ‘meaning’ of the 
speech and the implications for the future of British European policy. Some of the 
commentariat, such as Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan, judged it to be ‘the most 
Eurosceptic speech ever by a British prime minister’ (Hannan 2013). Majority opinion, 
however, was that the speech was sufficiently nuanced to require less in the way of 
‘soundbite’ analysis. This section analyses press coverage of the speech in three parts: how 
journalists dealt with the speech itself; domestic reaction; and international reaction. 
To begin, let us review the contours in the coverage of the address itself. In general 
the newspapers did not quote lengthy passages of the speech or reproduce it in its entirety. 
However, there were some interesting patterns in the soundbites and other passages used by 
journalists to convey the ‘essence’ of the speech to readers below the headline that the prime 
minister had pledged an in/out referendum. First, it was observed that Cameron wanted ‘to 
transform the terms of Britain’s membership of the EU by calling for the UK to be exempted 
from its founding principle: the creation of ever closer union’ (Watt 2013b). Cameron’s 
‘rejection’ of the touchstone sentiment of the Treaty of Rome was quoted most approvingly 
in Conservative Eurosceptic newspapers such as The Mail which saw the speech as ‘an 
historic ultimatum to Brussels’ – hand back ‘key powers’ or Britain will head for ‘the exit 
door’ (Chorley 2013a; see also Allen 2013). Second, there was some attention to Cameron’s 
‘five principles’ for a reformed EU (Hall 2013b; Watson and Savage 2013). Third, there was 
a strong press focus on Cameron’s mention of Britain as an ‘island nation’ – ‘bang within’ 
the faulty tradition of UK exceptionalism, noted novelist Marina Lewycka in the Independent 
(2013). Taken in isolation Cameron’s ‘island’ reference was reported as a defence of ‘British 
scepticism towards the EU’ (Hall 2013b). Put in context, however, newspapers more 
sympathetic to the EU pointed out that Cameron actually said ‘ours is not just an island story 
– it is also a continental story’. Thus, argued The Guardian leader, ‘the PM went out of his 
way to avoid pull-up-the-drawbridge-at-Dover slogans’ (Guardian 2013; see also Ackrill 
2013; Hoggart 2013). 
Fourth, there was a fair (but by no means headline) recognition that Cameron wanted 
Britain to remain inside the EU following a successful renegotiation and much emphasis was 
put on his pledge to campaign ‘heart and soul’ for a yes vote if workable EU reforms could 
be put in place (Allen 2013; Beattie 2013b; Mason 2013). In The Times Roland Watson and 
Michael Savage (2013) worried that ‘Parts of his speech sounded like the opening address of 
the 2017 “yes” campaign’. Finally, there was some comment on gaps in the speech because 
‘It was what Mr Cameron did not say that was interesting’ (Settle 2013). Echoing a strong 
line of questioning from the post-speech press conference question and answer session, The 
Guardian (see Watt 2013b) and The Express wanted to know how the prime minister would 
vote ‘if his blueprint for changes is rejected’, and wanted more details on ‘exactly what 
powers he wanted to claw back from Brussels’ (Beattie 2013b). The Independent felt 
similarly unenlightened: ‘the visitor certainly tore up the old rules. As to what the new ones 
will be, we left as we arrived, in the dark’ (Macintyre 2013). The Guardian editorial 
bemoaned that ‘dig down and this promising topsoil gives way to dust’ and that Cameron was 
without an explanation for how ‘his new Europe would create recovery’ (Guardian 2013). 
Even more gloomy voices than this were heard. For instance, Peter Dixon, chief UK 
economist at Commerzbank, said that ‘A referendum won’t solve anything. We will be semi-
detached members of Europe whether we have the referendum or not’ (quoted in Elliott 
2013). On the one hand, then, the press was sympathetic to the idea of a referendum and felt 
the speech would give Cameron a ‘brief boost’. On the other hand, readers of all newspapers 
were left with the impression that the renegotiation plan lacked substance (see Guardian 
2013). 
Away from the contents of the speech, press reportage was devoted to the reaction at 
home and abroad. It was obvious, wrote The Guardian, that the ‘speech’s real concern, 
however, was not with economics but politics – the politics of a restive Tory backbench, an 
insurgent UKIP and a mostly Europhobic press’ (Guardian 2013). The ‘Tory Hell’s Angels 
who are giving him such a hard time’ was how Simon Hoggart described the main audience 
for Cameron’s address (2013), The Express approving observing that they had been involved 
in the strategy unveiled at Bloomberg (Hall 2013b). The Mail added that the speech had ‘put 
pressure on Labour and the Lib Dems to back him or explain why the public should not have 
a say on EU membership’ (Chorley 2013a). In rank order on the domestic side the press 
focussed on Conservative reaction, coalition reaction, business reaction, then Labour, the 
UKIP and ‘other’ voices, so we will treat them in that order. 
The speech was delivered on the morning before the weekly round of Prime 
Minister’s Questions in the Parliament and the press uniformly noted the Conservative 
Party’s ‘delight’ on seeing Cameron, their ‘conquering hero’ (Newton Dunn 2013), enter the 
debating chamber (Beattie 2013b; Settle 2013). ‘Tory MPs were jubilant’, remarked Hall in 
The Express (2013b), ‘they greeted Cameron with massive cheering and waving of order 
papers’ (Hoggart 2013; see also the almost word for word repetition of that description in 
Chorley 2013a; Macintyre 2013). ‘Tory eurosceptics were thrilled to have secured a 
referendum’ wrote Joe Murphy in the Evening Standard (2013). Several newspapers reported 
that opinion-forming Eurosceptic Conservatives such as Mayor of London Boris Johnson had 
aligned themselves behind Cameron’s position (Mason 2013; Murphy 2013). Unsurprisingly 
fellow Cabinet ministers involved in the preparation of the speech, such as Chancellor 
George Osborne, were also quoted as backing the policy (see Mason 2013). 
Conservative Party delight was mirrored by disappointment amongst Liberal 
Democrat members of the coalition government: ‘Coalition at war on Europe’ ran the 
headline in The Daily Mirror (Beattie 2013b). The speech ‘stoked coalition tension with the 
Lib Dems’, recorded The Express (Hall 2013b). At Prime Minister’s Questions Clegg was 
said to be ‘glum looking’ (Macintyre 2013), ‘slunk in his seat’ (Settle 2013) and outside the 
chamber expressed ‘undisguised contempt for the address’ (Hall 2013b). Just as in the build-
up to the speech, Clegg’s widely quoted opinion was ‘that years and years of uncertainty 
because of a protracted, ill-defined renegotiation of our place in Europe is not in the national 
interest because it hits growth and jobs’ (quoted in Chorley 2013a; Murphy 2013; Watson 
and Savage 2013). Clegg was echoing business opinion which continued to centre its critique 
of Cameron’s policy on the economic uncertainty it would generate. The key voice heard in 
the reporting was that of Martin Sorrell, chief of advertising group WPP, speaking at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, who described the referendum as a ‘fifth grey swan … It 
is at least neutral, it is at worst negative. It can’t be positive. You’ve just added another 
reason why people will postpone investment decisions’ (quoted in Ahmed and Armitstead 
2013; see also Elliott 2013). Other business leaders expressing concern about the uncertainty 
a referendum would bring included Roland Rudd, chairman of Business for New Europe 
(Beattie 2013b), Roger Carr, president of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) (Elliott 
2013), John Cridland, director-general of the CBI who gave a ‘cautious response’ to the 
speech (Murphy 2013), former CBI director-general Howard Davies (Elliott 2013), and 
Andrew Cahn, former head of UK Trade and Investment, who feared an ‘investment chill’ 
(Beattie 2013). The odd dissenting business voice favouring a referendum was heard, but 
these were in the minority (Ahmed and Armitstead 2013). 
On the domestic politics of the speech The Times heralded it as a step in the direction 
of the 2015 general election campaign because it had conveniently put Labour into disarray: 
‘Labour spent yesterday seeking to clarify the party’s position’ which was uneasily balanced 
between Ed Miliband’s decision to rule out an in/out referendum now, but to leave open the 
possibility of one in the future (Watson and Savage 2013). By ruling out a plebiscite The 
Mail judged that Miliband ‘risked a party split’ (Chorley 2013a), with one ex-Labour 
government minister quoted as saying Miliband had ‘got it wrong’ (Kate Hoey in Wilson and 
Schofield 2013). However, Miliband did manage to find common ground with Clegg and big 
business and land some hits on Cameron over the dispatch box, with his accusations that the 
prime minister was ‘going to put Britain through years of uncertainty and take a huge gamble 
with our economy’ (quoted in Chorley 2013a). UKIP’s Nigel Farage welcomed the 
referendum pledge but said it did not need to be preceded by a renegotiation: ‘By kicking the 
can down the road for up to five years that doesn’t deal with the immediacy of many of the 
threats and problems that our membership of the EU presents’ (quoted in Chorley 2013a). For 
UKIP, the Bloomberg speech went just about far enough but not fast enough. 
If the domestic reaction was mixed, international reaction was more one sided: 
Cameron ‘drew fury from Europe’ (Murphy 2013). French commentary was reported to have 
been particularly scathing and the Bloomberg speech was ‘immediately ridiculed by the 
French government’ (Allen 2013; Chorley 2013a). France’s Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius 
was widely quoted from an interview given just before the speech was delivered: ‘If Britain 
wants to leave the Europe we will roll out the red carpet’ (Beattie 2013b). He added a 
sporting metaphor: ‘If you want to join the football club, you can’t then say you want to play 
rugby’ (Chorley 2013a; Murphy 2013; Newton Dunn 2013). French reaction prompted The 
Guardian (2013) to represent the speech as a policy gamble that might unwittingly backfire: 
‘Paris could prove much more relaxed about a UK exit than he presumes’. Several other 
‘brickbats’ and a ‘storm of protest’ (Hall 2013b) were heard from other European capitals and 
around the world, pouring water on Cameron’s strategy. For example, Guy Verhofstadt, 
leader of the Liberals in the European Parliament, said Cameron was ‘playing with fire’ 
(quoted in Murphy 2013; see also Allen 2013; Beattie 2013b; Chorley 2013a). Spanish 
Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo accused Britain of ‘dragging its feet’ and 
warned about the economic consequences of withdrawal (in Allen 2013). Meanwhile, 
Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister Eamon Gilmore put the case for a continued British 
presence inside the EU (in Allen 2013). The Telegraph pointed out Barack Obama and his 
‘Eurofederalist advisers’ had again come out in favour of Britain’s EU membership but said 
that it contradicted the more than half of UK voters who would vote to leave the EU in a vote 
(Gardiner 2013). 
The hardest country to ‘pin down’ in terms of a consistent line on the Bloomberg 
speech proved to be Germany, its positivity even moving The Sun to run an editorial listing 
‘Ten reasons to love Germany’ (Harvey 2013). UK newspapers noted, seemingly to their 
surprise, that Chancellor Angela Merkel – ‘the EU’s most powerful leader’ (Newton Dunn 
2013) was ‘prepared to talk to the UK about its concerns over the EU’ (Beattie 2013b) with a 
view to finding a ‘fair compromise’ to keep Britain inside the organization (quoted in Hall 
2013b; see also Allen 2013; Chorley 2013a). The Guardian interpreted her ‘guarded’ 
response as a success for Cameron’s pre-speech briefings (Watt et al. 2013). Merkel’s 
neutral-to-positive reaction was, apparently, only surpassed by Netherlands Prime Minister 
Mark Rutte who praised Cameron’s ‘sharp analysis’ (in Newton Dunn 2013). The Guardian, 
however, contradicted The Sun by reporting that Rutte ‘sat on the fence’ along with French 
President Francois Hollande: ‘Cameron’s only whole-hearted backing came from prime 
minister of the Czech Republic’ (Watt et al. 2013). German Foreign Minister Guido 
Westerwelle, however, was universally reported to have been vehemently critical: ‘Cherry-
picking is not an option’ (quoted in Allen 2013; Beattie 2013b; Newton Dunn 2013; Watt et 
al. 2013). Finally, Gunther Krickbaum, head of the Bundestag’s European Affairs Committee 
asked bluntly: ‘Cameron said that he wants Britain to shape the future. How can you shape 
the future if you put the car in reverse while other regions of the world are on the fast lane?’ 
(in Allen 2013). This is a good illustration of the kind of unremittingly hostile international 
reaction most frequently heard in the UK press coverage of the aftermath of the Bloomberg 
speech. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has examined press coverage of David Cameron’s Bloomberg speech by treating 
it as a drama in three acts: build-up, speech and aftermath. The data analysed above was 
drawn from a very wide range of national and regional/local newspapers. The intention was 
to generate an in-depth picture of how reports of the speech interplayed with existing 
newspaper editorial positions on the British and ‘Europe’. The main conclusion from the 
analysis in the chapter is that newspaper narratives – now relatively well established in the 
reportage – perform the following ideological tasks for newspaper readers: they represent the 
EU as ‘other’; they engender fear and concern about intrusions by faceless ‘Brussels’ 
bureaucrats on British daily life, freedoms and sovereignty; they obsess about French and 
German intentions by summoning memories of past antagonisms to speculate on future aims; 
they assess Britain’s European policy dilemmas principally and sometimes only through the 
lenses of domestic party politics; they present British leaders as powerless and self-serving; 
and they posit that Britain’s identity is an ‘awkward’ and semi-detached entity within the EU. 
‘Hard’ Euroscepticism remains the default setting for the vast majority of UK newspapers, 
with a form of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism pervading the rest of the coverage. 
The second conclusion, deepening the previous, is that press coverage of the 
Bloomberg speech did open up some albeit limited space for ‘dissident’ Europhile voices to 
be heard, either those pressing for the British to remain inside the EU or those critiquing 
Cameron’s policy as a dangerous ‘gamble’ with the economy. However, as with pro-
Europeanism in Britain in general, these voices were few and far between and did not lessen 
the general tenor of the coverage, particularly in the most widely read titles such as The Sun, 
Mail and Express, that the referendum was a vital opportunity to reject UK membership once 
and for all. The third conclusion is that although there was an evident press focus on the same 
themes, issues, debates and soundbites, the factual content of the coverage was very much 
subservient to the ideological preferences of the newspaper. The same ‘voices’ commenting 
on the Bloomberg speech before and after Cameron delivered it were heard, but some were 
interpreted very differently depending on newspaper outlet (note the clashing views on 
Rutte’s reaction to the speech and the different interpretations placed on the speech by instant 
commentators (Gannon 2014, pp.222–23). What all this suggests is that Cameron’s 
diplomacy with EU leaders and institutions during a potential renegotiation of the UK terms 
of membership will be as complex as will be his management of the European issue at home 
(see Pentland 2014, p.19). Whatever the political strategy adopted on European policy after 
the 2015 election, any British prime minister will have a considerable task persuading the 
public because vast swathes of the opinion-forming press continue to doubt that Britain’s best 
future is inside the EU. 
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